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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY.
Petitioner.
v.

*
*

SUPREME COURT

*
*

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and THE DEFAULT
INDEMNITY FUND.
Respondents.

*
*
*

Case No. 21049
Category No. 6

*

RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
David B. Paulsen was injured while in the employ of
his brother. Thomas A. Paulsen, dba Thomas A. Paulsen Company
(R. 14. 20. 71). Thomas Paulsen was uninsured for workers'
compensation coverage at the time of injury contrary to the
mandatory insurance provision of Section 35-1-46 (U.C.A.. 1953,
as amended. R. 40-41, 72). He had apparently attempted to
secure insurance for his brother, his only employee, through

Respondents submit this summary to correct and
supplement petitioner's "Statement of Facts" which is in some
ways misleading and incomplete.

Gail Jones, an independent insurance agent, dba Rogers
Insurance, Incorporated (R. 41). Mr. Jones "failed to properly
order the insurance, failed to follow through to obtain a
completed policy, and failed to forward the premium payment to
any company...."

(See the Consent Decree issued by the

Insurance Commissioner of the State of Utah In the Matter of
Gail Jones, Rogers Insurance, Inc., attached as Addendum "A".)
The Findings of Fact entered by the law judge after a
hearing before the Industrial Commission on David's application
for workers' compensation benefits enumerated the benefits to
which David was entitled and went on to say:

"These...are the

responsibility of the employer, since the employer was
uninsured for workers' compensation purposes at the time of the
industrial injury" (R. 72). The law judge also found that
Thomas Paulsen was "in no position to pay... the...benefits due
in this matter for the reason that for all practical purposes
[he] is insolvent."

(R. 73)

Neither David, nor his brother, Thomas Paulsen, were
represented by counsel at the time of the hearing (R. 71).
Since, at the time of the hearing, petitioner was
unable to pay the award, the Order entered by the Industrial
Commission on January 22, 1985, directed the Default Indemnity
Fund to pay the benefits.

This Order failed to include the
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language from the Findings of Fact regarding petitioner's
ultimate liability or any language from Section 35-1-107(3)
(U.C.A., 1953, as amended) regarding the Default Indemnity
Fund's right of subrogation against petitioner.
None of the parties sought review of that Order.

In

petitioner's "Statement of Facts" he alleges that he "did not
seek review because the Order had no effect on him."
(Petitioner's Brief, at p. 5)

As to petitioner's alleged

motivation; there is no evidence below to support such a
"fact", it is raised for the first time on appeal, and is
irrelevant.
not true.

That the "Order had no effect on" petitioner is
The Order, together with the Findings of Fact and

the applicable law, created subrogation rights in the Default
Indemnity Fund.

The Fund's attempt to enforce those rights

precipitated this appeal.
The award of benefits, as ordered by the commission,
was satisfied by the Fund shortly after entry of the January
Order.
The Default Indemnity Fund subsequently filed a motion
on September 24, 1985, pursuant to Section 35-1-78, (U.C.A.,
1953, as amended).

The motion requested the entry of a

supplemental or amended order (R. 76). An amended order was
necessary for two reasons:

1.

A clerical error in the
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original Order resulted in the omission of the specific finding
of fact regarding the employer's ultimate liability; and 2.
The total award in the January 22, 1985, Order was $21,066.73
of which $6,804.49 represented medical bills.

The Default

Indemnity Fund, pursuant to its authority under Section
35-1-107(7), adjusted these bills which resulted in a total
payment by the Fund of only $21,022.72.

The original Order

needed to be amended to reflect the sum actually paid by the
Fund.

Each of these amendments were necessary before the Fund

could, in exercising its subrogation rights, docket the award
in the District Court pursuant to Section 35-1-59 (U.C.A.,
1953, as amended).
The Default Indemnity Fund's motion was granted and a
Supplemental Order was signed on October 8, 1985 (R. 77). The
petitioner filed a Motion for Review of the Supplemental Order
on October 23, 1985 (pp. 77-81).

That Motion was denied and

this appeal taken therefrom.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Petitioner raises two issues on appeal;
1.

Does the DefauLt Indemnity Fund have a right to

reimbursement from an uninsured employer?
2.

and, if so,

Was the procedure used by the Fund to enforce its

rights correct?
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT
FROM PETITIONER AS AN UNINSURED EMPLOYER.
A.
An employer cannot escape ultimate
liability for workers' compensation
benefits in a workers1 compensation case.
An employees' right to receive, and an employer's duty
to provide workers compensation benefits are created and
defined by Statute.

See Sections 35-1-45, 35-1-46, 35-1-52,

35-1-56, 35-1-57, 35-1-58, 35-1-59, 35-1-60 (U.C.A., 1953, as
amended); Martinez v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et.al., 34
U.A.R. 32, (May 19, 1986); and cases cited therein.

These laws

are "part of several interrelated social welfare enactments..."
and are founded on the principle "that industry should bear its
fair share of the burdens it creates through injuries to those
who serve in it...."

United Air Transport Corp. v. Industrial

Commission, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591; Barber Asphalt Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 cited with
approval in Spencer v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 390 P.2d
692 (1930) at p. 693 and Martinez, supra at p. 33.
An "incidental, though important" element in this
system is the requirement that all employers provide workers'
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compensation insurance for their employees.

However, even if

it is found that an employer has a valid insurance policy
providing workers' compensation coverage, he does not escape
liability for claims made by his employees.

Larson, Workmen* s

Compensation Law, Desk Edition, Section 1.00 through 2.70;
Industrial Commission v. Daley Mining Co., Utah, 172 P. 301
(1918) at p. 304; and American Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 187 P. 633 (1920).
The reasoning behind the above mentioned principle is
set forth in the case of American Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 187 P. 633 (1920).

The case involved an

employer, American Fuel, which had secured coverage through
"the Guardian Casualty & Guaranty Company, a stock corporation
authorized to transact the business of workmens' compensation
insurance...."
25, 1917.

American Fuel's employee was injured on July

Guardian admitted liability and commenced payment of

benefits to the employee.

Guardian was subsequently placed in

the hands of a receiver and declared insolvent.

On October 29,

1919, the Industrial Commission found that the employee was
entitled to benefits in addition to those paid by Guardian and
ordered that these benefits be paid by the employer.

The

employer argued that "by procuring insurance, it was relieved
from all liability to pay compensation to its injured employee.
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and that the sole liability to pay the compensation ordered by
the commission revolved upon the Guardian Casualty Guaranty
Company..." supra, at p. 633.

In rejecting the employees

argument, the Supreme Court queried:
What is meant by the words "employers shall
secure compensation to their employees"? Does it
mean they shall obtain an insurance policy and
thereby be relieved of all responsibility to the
employees who have no voice in making the
selection of the insurance carrier? Or does it
not plainly appear, both from the letter and the
spirit of the law, that the employer "shall
secure"--make sure, make more certain—the
payment of compensation, leaving the obligation
still that of the employer? The primary
obligation on the part of the employer is to pay
compensation when awarded. Insurance is
incidental, though important. It is necessary
because employers sometimes fail in business and
because payments to injured employees or their
dependents are frequently distributed over long
periods of time. To make more certain the prompt
payment of these awards the insurance feature was
provided by the law...and awards rendered against
the employer for the payment of compensation
under the provisions of this title.
If the employer is relieved from liability
when he procures his insurance, why should an
award be rendered against him?...[Emphasis
supplied].
The Court went on to hold that:
Reading the statute as a whole, and considering
all of its provisions, the plain and unmistakable
import of the language of the act compels the
conclusion that the right to compensation arises
out of the relation existing between employer and
employee; that compensation is a tax upon
industry or upon the employer's business, a tax
that is added to the price of the product and is
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ultimately paid by the consumer; that the
employer is primarily liable for compensation to
the employee; that both employer and insurance
carrier are liable for the payment of
compensation to the injured employee; and that
the default of either will not excuse payment by
the other. [Emphasis supplied]
Supra at pp. 634-635.
It is clear that an employer does not and cannot
escape liability in workers' compensation cases simply by
procuring insurance.

This should be no less true of an

employer who has violated the law.

It can not be said that the

legislature intended that a complying employer be liable in the
event his insurance carrier defaults, but a non-complying
employer has no obligation to his employees in the event he
2
testifies he is temporarily unable to pay the claim.
B,
The existence of the Default Indemnity
Fund does not alter or excuse an
employer's ultimate liability under the law.
The Default Indemnity Fund was created by the
legislature in 1984 in response to the insolvency of a
certified self-insured employer.

That insolvency, which

occurred in 1983, resulted in the loss of workers'

Respondents admit that an employer's liability
might be discharged by a court of competent jurisdiction as in
a bankruptcy proceeding under federal law, however, that is not
the case here.
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compensation benefits by many injured employees.

Their plight

brought to focus a problem which had plagued the Industrial
Commission since it was established at the turn of the century.
An employee is often unable to resume employment after
an injury.

Outstanding medical bills can result in additional

financial pressure.

Most private health insurance policies

specifically exclude coverage for on-the-job injuries.

Health

care providers often refuse all but emergency care when a
patient is without insurance and unable to pay.

An injured

employee, unable to work and in need of medical care, is among
society's most disadvantaged citizens if there are no workers1
compensation benefits available to satisfy his ongoing
expenses.

Where his employer has no insurance, or inadequate

insurance, the employer is ultimately responsible for workers'
compensation benefits under the Act.

When the employer is

unable to pay because of insolvency, the injured employee must
shoulder the entire burden of financial and physical loss.
The purpose of the Default Indemnity Fund is to pay
and assure workers' compensation benefits to injured workers
when the employer, whether self-insured or uninsured, "becomes
insolvent...or otherwise does not have sufficient funds [or]
insurance...to cover workers' compensation liability...."
Petitioner argues in his brief that "[t]here is
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nothing in Section 35-1-107 which would indicate that merely
because the Default Indemnity Fund paid an award to the
employee, the award is the responsibility of the employer."
Petitioner cites no facts nor legal authority in support of
this argument.

It is simply an incorrect and tortured reading

of that Section and ignores several relevant code provisions:
Section 35-1-45 states;
Every employee...who is injured,...by accident
arising out of or in the course of his
employment,...shall be entitled to receive, and
shall be paid, such compensation for loss
sustained on account of such injury....
Section 35-1-46 provides that;
Employers... shall secure compensation to their
employees...by insuring, and keeping insured, the
payment of such compensation.... [or by
certifying as a qualified self-insured.] Any
employer who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of [this] section...shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
Section 35-1-58 states;
Any employee, whose employer [is uninsured]...,
may, in lieu of proceeding against his employer
by civil action in the courts...file his
application with the commission for
compensation...and the commission shall hear and
determine such application for compensation as in
other cases; and the amount of compensation which
the commission may ascertain and determine to be
due to such injured employee...shall be paid by
such employer....
Section 35-1-107(1) provides;
There is created a Default Indemnity Fund for the
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purpose of paying and assuring,. ..workers'
compensation benefits [to employees]
when...[their] employer becomes insolvent, ... or
otherwise does not have sufficient funds...to
cover workers* compensation liabilities under
this chapter.
Section 35-1-107(3) provides;
To the extent of the compensation and other
benefits paid or payable to an employee...from
the Default Indemnity Fund, the Fund, by
subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and
benefits of the employee...against the employer
failing to make the compensation payments.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner's argument that there is nothing in Section
35-1-107 which would indicate that the award is the
responsibility of the employer also ignores this Court's
holding in American Fuel, supra.

In interpreting Section 3134

(comp. Laws Utah 1917, now Section 35-1-58) this court observed
that the legislature used "the words 'compensation...from an
employer' - not from the insurance carrier..." thus intending
that the employer be ultimately liable, not the insurance
carrier.

(supra, at p. 635)

Had the legislature intended that

an uninsured employer escape liability for payment of benefits
to his employees when it created the Default Indemnity Fund,
Section 35-1-58 should have been amended to read:

"Any

employee, whose employer [is uninsured]..., shall be paid by
the Default Indemnity Fund."
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Additionally, Section 35-1- 107(1) is rendered
nonsensical under petitioner's analysis.

That subsection

provides that the Default Indemnity Fund shall pay and assure
compensation benefits to employees. Assure means "to make
3
safe...sure or certain: insure" and applies here to
employees who are entitled to compensation benefits.
Petitioner's analysis might have been correct had that section
provided that the Default Indemnity Fund assure employers who
are found liable for compensation benefits.

Of course, such a

provision would have, in effect, abolished mandatory insurance
by eliminating employer liability altogether.
Here, petitioner attempted to obtain workers'
compensation insurance for his brother on February 23, 1984.
(R. 41.)

The injury occurred on April 1, 1984.

It is not

unreasonable to assume that David was employed throughout that
period of time, and that petitioner did not have insurance
during that same period.

Section 35-1-46 provides that

petitioner is thus guilty of 36 separate Class B Misdemeanors
subject to a minimum fine of $10.00 each or a jail sentence of

3

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary,
Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1985, p.110.
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30 days each.

That the legislature saw fit to punish

non-compliance in this case, had petitioner been charged and
convicted, with up to 3 years in jail, can only be interpreted
to mean that the legislature intended non-compliance to carry a
significant punishment.

To argue that the legislature

subsequently passed legislation requiring the Default Indemnity
Fund to indemnify that same non-complying employer and relieve
him of his financial obligation to his employee interprets
Section 35-1-107 in a manner which ignores and makes a mockery
of 80 years of workers1 compensation law.
Finally, the Findings of Fact entered on January 22,
1985, state that while the employer made "good faith...efforts
to obtain workers* compensation coverage," he "was
uninsured...at the time of the industrial injury."

Had the

employer disagreed with this finding, he should have filed a
Motion for Review within fifteen days of the entry of those
findings.

Since he did not, he is forever barred.

Petitioner

cannot re-open and re-litigate the question of liability before
the commission.
C.
The Default Indemnity Fund is
entitled to reimbursement from
a non-complying employer.
Petitioner argues that because Section 35-1-107(3)
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does not specifically state that the Industrial Commission can
direct that an employer reimburse the Default Indemnity Fund,
the October 8, 1985, Order exceeds the powers of the commission.
Respondents agree that an administrative body "can
only exercise those powers which are conferred upon it by
statute", however, petitioner's argument tortures the meaning
of the words "conferred ... by statute."
The Industrial Commission, as an administrative body,
is not vested with the power to interpret, construe, reform,
apply or make new contracts of insurance in workers'
compensation cases, see:

Continental Casualty Co. v.

Industrial Commission, Utah, 210 P. 127, (1922), and Empry v.
Industrial Commission, Utah, 63 P. 2d 630, (1937).

Had the law

judge in this case made a finding against Gail Jones or Rogers
Insurance Company on the basis of contract law, (that Jones had
agreed to secure coverage for petitioner) such a finding would
have clearly been beyond the statutory authority of the
Industrial Commission.

By that same reasoning, the Industrial

Commission was clearly without authority to find that the
employer was not liable for benefits.
Petitioner argues that the Industrial Commission is
not authorized to order petitioner to reimburse the Default
Indemnity Fund because "the law judge felt the employer to be
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liable only if other sources of funds were not available.
Because there were no personal funds available from Paulsen and
because there were funds available from the Default Indemnity
Fund, the Judge concluded the the employer was not liable."
Petitioner cites no facts in support of this argument; but,
were there facts to support such a "feeling" on the part of the
law judge, a finding or order to that effect would have
certainly been beyond the authority of the Industrial
Commission.
This argument also ignores the Fund's subrogation
rights and Section 35-1-107(8) which provides:
For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the
commission, upon rendering a decision with
respect to any claim from the Default
Indemnity Fund for compensation under this
chapter, shall impose a penalty against the
employer of 15% of the total award made in the
claim and shall direct that the additional
penalty be paid into the fund. Awards may be
docketed as other awards under this chapter.
This subsection, when read together with Section
35-1-107 (1) and (3) makes it clear that the legislature did
not intend that an employer escape liability by the creation of
the fund and, in fact, provided for additional penalties
against an employer in the event the Fund was required to
advance payment for compensation benefits.
Petitioner would have this Court believe that while
the Industrial Commission clearly has the authority to order an
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employer to pay benefits directly to his employee, the
Commission lacks authority to order the employer to reimburse
the Default Indemnity Fund for payment of those same benefits.
Petitioner does not discuss how his argument squares with the
Fund's subrogation rights.

Since the Fund has all of the

rights of an employee pursuant to subrogation and the employee
has elected to enforce his rights in the Industrial Commission
("in lieu" of in the civil courts), the Industrial Commission's
authority to order the employer to reimburse the Fund pursuant
to subrogation is identical to the Commission's authority to
order the employer to pay the employee directly.

Without such

authority on the part of the Industrial Commission, how would
the Default Indemnity Fund enforce its subrogation rights?
Since the employee has elected to proceed before the Industrial
Commission, the Fund could not pursue an action in the civil
courts.

The Fund must, in following the employee's rights,

pursue and perfect its cause before the Industrial Commission.
Petitioner is not without a remedy in this case.

The

investigation conducted by the Insurance Department for the
State of Utah and petitioner's statements at the time of the
hearing in this matter reveal that petitioner requested that
Mr. Jones of Rogers Insurance secure workers' compensation
coverage for his employee.

Mr. Jones sent a memo to the
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American Home Insurance Company on February 23, 1984, which
purported to place an order for that coverage.

On March 8,

1984, Mr. Jones received a letter from American Home stating
that the company did not write workers' compensation coverage
and could not insure petitioner.

Mr. Jones apparently did not

notify petitioner of this and claims to have requested coverage
with a different carrier.

This second carrier denied that it

had had any communication with Jones or Rogers Insurance
regarding petitioner's request for coverage.
Inasmuch as petitioner is ultimately liable for the
benefits awarded in this case, his appropriate remedy lies in a
cause of action seeking reimbursement from Jones. Rogers
Insurance, American Home Insurance and/or the "second
carrier".

That cause of action could only be brought by the

petitioner and could only be heard in the District Court, not
4
the Industrial Commission.

.

.

.

The Industrial Commission

clearly lacks jurisdiction to determine liability posed by the
facts in respect to insurance coverage.

These and related

questions are appropriately answered in a judicial forum.
POINT II
THE MOTION OF THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND AND
THE RESULTING ORDER OF OCTOBER 8. 198 5,
WERE PROCEDURALLY CORRECT.
4

The employee, and thus the Fund by subrogation, has
no cause of action against these people or entities as the
contract to provide insurance, if one in fact existed, existed
between petitioner and/or Jones etc.
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A.
The Default Indemnity's Motion was made to correct
a clerical error contained in the January 22,
1985, Order.
The procedure by which an employee, or the Fund when
exercising its subrogation rights, enforces these rights
against an uninsured employer is set forth in Section 35-1-59
(U.C.A., 1953, as amended).

An abstract of the commission's

award is docketed in the district court and may be enforced as
if it were a judgment of the district court.
The Order issued in this case on January 22, 1985,
ordered that the Fund pay the benefits.

An abstract of this

Order would have been useless against the employer.

In

reviewing the Findings of Fact entered in conjunction with that
Order, it is clear that the law judge had omitted language from
the Order regarding the employer's ultimate liability.

Since

this was a clerical error, the Default Indemnity Fund made a
motion to amend the Order so that it correctly reflected the
Findings of Fact, the express intent of the law judge and the
law applicable to this case.

That motion was granted pursuant

to the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction under
Section 35-1-78.
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:
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(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the
court orders.
U.R.C.P., 1953, as amended.
This Court has consistently held that a Rule 60(a)
motion is the only proper remedy in facts such as are presented
in this case.

Here, the law judge set forth in unambiguous

language the liability of the petitioner.

After enumerating

the expenses incurred by the employee as a result of the
injury, the finding was that "[t]these expenses are the
responsibility of the employer...."

Because of the employer's

then present inability to pay this obligation, the law judge
found that the employee was entitled to an award from the
Default Indemnity Fund.

The Order which was based upon those

findings inadvertently failed to reflect either the Fund's
subrogation rights as against the employer or the employer's
ultimate responsibility for payment of the benefits.

Inasmuch

as the Order did not reflect, and was thus not supported by the
findings, the Order is fatally defective.

Where the defect is

"apparent on the face of the record," it can and must be
corrected either by motion of counsel or sua sponte.
Evans et al., Utah, 282 P. 217 (1913).
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In Re

In Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Insurance Co., Utah,
669 P.2d 1201 (1983), this Court noted that the jury verdict
and the resulting judgment contained an error in addition.

In

remanding the case for correction of this error, the court held
that:
Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court may correct clerical
mistakes in judgments at any time. In
explanation of the intent of the identical
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the comment has
been made that "in this broad approach to
correctability under Rule 60(a), it matters
little whether an error was made by the court
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the
judge himself, so long as it is clearly a formal
error that should be corrected in the interest of
having judgment, order, or other part of the
record reflect what was done or intended. The
definition of "clerical mistake" thus extends to
include the one here discovered. It is a type of
mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is
apparent on the record and which does not involve
a legal decision or judgment by an attorney.
[Emphasis supplied]
Citations omitted Stanger, supra, at p. 1206.
A Rule 60(a) motion, is also proper when the mistake
involves more than a mere error in addition.

In Dairy

Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union 976, Utah, 396 P.2d 47
(1964), the clerk, "[i]n entering the judgment on the
verdict,...did not fill in the blanks provided for
interest...."

A Rule 60(a) motion was made more than six years

after entry of the judgment and was granted by the trial
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court.

In upholding the granting of that motion, this Court

stated:
We have no doubt about the correctness of the
general rule that when a judgment has become
final, the court is without authority to change
it. Howeverf...[this does] not apply to
situations such as the instant one, where there
was merely a correction of an inadvertent
omission.... The trial court in no way
transgressed its authority in filling in the
omission and making the record show what was true
under the law anyway. Its action was in
conformity with the well-established precept that
mere lapse of time will not prevent the court
from correcting errors or omissions.... It is
recognized that clerical errors may be corrected
or omissions supplied so the record will
accurately reflect that which in fact took
place. [Emphasis supplied]
Citations omitted Dairy, supra, at p. 48.
More directly on point are those cases upholding 60(a)
motions used to amend judgments which fail to correctly reflect
the findings of fact and/or conclusions of law previously
entered by the court.

In Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., et al,

Utah, 579 P.2d 917 (1978), a quiet title action, the
conclusions of law granted "to the plaintiffs possession of the
property and quieting title in the said plaintiffs to the
property....

The Decree however failed to incorporate the

provision of the Conclusions of Law pertaining to the quieting
of title...."

Although that Decree had previously been

affirmed by the Supreme Court, a 60(a) motion to amend was
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granted.

In upholding the amendment, it was noted that:
The fact that this Court had in the interim
affirmed the erroneous decree is of no
consequence.... The trial court may correct
clerical mistakes in judgments at any time. Our
decision here must turn upon whether or not the
alleged error in the 1974 Decree was clerical in
nature. This Court has previously discussed the
distinction between a judicial error and a
clerical error...[and has made] the following
observation: The distinction...depends on
whether it [the error] was made in rendering the
judgment or in recording the judgment as
rendered. Whether the substantive rights of the
respective parties are affected is not
determinative. [emphasis supplied]
Citations omitted, Bagnall, supra, at p. 918.
Petitioner in the case argues that the law judge, by

his October 8, 1985, Order, "'sought to review a final award of
the Commission."

The "final award" referred to is the January

22, 1985, Order which was signed by the law judge and was not
in fact reviewed by the Commission, no motion for review having
been filed.
error.

Bagnall, supra, is dispositive of this alleged

Even had the Industrial Commission, and this Court,

reviewed and affirmed the January 22, 1985, Order, the
subsequent correction of the clerical error would have been
proper.
In Smith v. Smith, Utah, 251 P.2d 720 (1952), the
California Court of Appeal upheld an Order which amended and
corrected the "Journal Entry of Judgment and Decree of
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Divorce".

The findings portion of the "Journal Entry" stated:

"the defendant shall deliver 'certain property to plaintiff in
conformance with the property settlement agreement previously
entered into by the parties.1"

The Decree, however, merely

approved the property settlement without making any awards or
orders with respect thereto.

After the time for appeal had

expired, plaintiff made a motion to correct this clerical error
which was granted.

The resulting amended Decree ordered that

the "parties perform the property settlement agreement" and
ordered the defendant to transfer the disputed property to the
plaintiff.

The defendant appealed and argued that the amended

order "made a substantive change and corrected a judicial error
rather than a clerical error."

In upholding the Amended Order,

the Court noted that:
"Clerical" errors are, generally speaking, those
errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the
result of the judicial function. Mistakes of the
court are not necessarily judicial errors. The
distinction between a "clerical" error and a
"judicial" one does not depend so much upon the
person making the error as upon whether it was
the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and
determination.... In line with the general rule,
it is settled that a court, on motion of an
interested party or on its own motion, may, at
any time, correct or amend by a nunc pro tunc
order any clerical error so as to make the record
speak the truth and show the judgment which was
actually rendered by the court. The function of
a nunc pro tunc order is merely to correct the
record of the judgment and not to alter the
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judgment actually rendered — not to make an order
now for then, but to enter now for then an order
previously made. The question presented to the
court on a hearing of a motion for a nunc pro
tunc order is: What order was in fact made at
the time by the trial judge? What transpired
when the judgment was announced is a guestion of
fact; and where the findings thereon are
supported by substantial evidence, they are
conclusive. [Emphasis supplied]
Citations omitted Smith, supra, at p. 724.
In the Colorado case of Reasoner v. District Court In
And For Water Division, Colo., 594 P.2d 1060 (1979), the trial
court issued its oral findings and order from the bench at the
conclusion of the trial and directed counsel for plaintiff to
prepare the written decree.

The decree was signed but not

mailed to defendant until after the time for appeal had run.
Defendant then made a motion for "clarification" and upon
receipt thereof, the trial court sua sponte amended the written
decree.

In upholding the amendment, the court noted that:
This case is an example of precisely the type of
error that...Rule 60(a), is designed to remedy.
By allowing the court to amend the...decree to
accurately reflect the oral findings and order,
the amended decree speaks the truth of the
court1s intent. It does no damage to the
respective interests of the parties, but rather
it fulfills their expectations as to what the
decree was intended to say. The rule thus
provides a safety valve by which courts can avoid
the stubborn enforcement of an honestly mistaken
judgment. [Emphasis supplied]
Citation omitted Reasoner, supra, at p. 1061.
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The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of In the
Matter of Estate of Kimball. Wyo.. 583 P.2d 1274 (1978)
explained the reasoning behind this rule.

In that case, the

trial court issued its decree in 1949 which expressly provided
that the property of the estate be "distributed in accordance
with the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased"
and enumerated most of the terms of the will.

The decree

omitted, however, the condition that the devisee survive Anne
Kimball, the wife of the deceased, a condition expressly
intended in the will.

The devisee died in 1972 and in 1974 a

motion was made to correct the decree.

In upholding the

amended order, the Wyoming court noted that the decree
"demonstrably contains a complete contradiction in its
terms...."

The trial court's express intent, to distribute the

property "in accordance with the terms of the" will, was not
reflected in the decree.

Since there is no question as to the

court's intent, the amended order was not only proper but
necessary to remove any uncertainty in the final decree.
In the case at bar, the motion of the Default
Indemnity Fund was made to correct the judgment to reflect the
unambiguous language of the Findings as well as the law.

b

5

That the amended or Supplemental Order of October
8, 1985, "speaks the truth of the court's intent" finds further
support in the fact that the same law judge entered both orders
in this case.
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The petitioner argues, however, that the Fund's only remedy was
to appeal.

That is not correct.

"An appeal is not the proper

procedural remedy to correct such errors..." since clerical
errors can be appropriately remedied by a Rule 60(a) motion to
the trial court.

W. F. Construction Company v. Kalik, Idaho,

652 P.2d 661 (1982) .
B.
The Industrial Commission has the authority to
grant a Rule 60(a) type
motion pursuant to its
continuing power and jurisdiction in
workers' compensation cases.
While it is clear that the Default Indemnity Fund's
motion and the resulting Order of October 8, 1985, were proper
under the rules of civil procedure, it might be said that since
this is an administrative proceeding, a Rule 60(a) type motion
does not lie.

That would leave the Fund with no remedy in this

case, and in future cases, a cumbersome, expensive and time
consuming remedy.

For if an administrative body cannot correct

its obvious mistakes through a simple Rule 60(a) type motion
and order, an aggrieved party might be forced to appeal to the
Supreme Court.

And, if the error was not detected within the

appeal time, there would be no remedy.

It cannot be said that

the legislature intended such a harsh outcome in workers'
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compensation cases.

In reading Section 35-1-88 (U.C.A., 1953,

as amended), the legislative intent seems clear:

the

Industrial Commission shall develop a procedure whereby it is
not bound by:
the usual common law or statutory rules of
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of
procedure...as in [the commission's] judgment is
best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the
spirit of the workmen's compensation act.
Such was the holding in Callihan v. Department of
Labor and Industries, Wash., 516 P.2d 1073 (1973).

In that

case, the employee in a workers' compensation case sustained an
injury to her right arm.

She was awarded benefits as prayed in

an administrative order which incorrectly referred to the
injury as having been sustained to her left arm.
Ms. Callihan "accepted the compensation award and took
no appeal from the [Department of Labor & Industries] order.
[The Supreme Court assumed she] did so in good faith believing
the erroneous reference to the left arm was a pure
inadvertence."
Six months later Ms. Callihan filed a motion to
re-open her case because her condition had worsened.

Her

motion was denied by the department and she appealed to the
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals claiming that the error
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(left arm instead of right arm) could not be corrected and that
she was entitled to a second and separate award for her right
arm.
The board noted that the clerical error was not
necessarily apparent on the face of the department's order and
ordered that a hearing be held before the board on the clerical
error issue.

Ms. Callihan appealed the board's Order to the

Supreme Court on the grounds that neither the department nor
the board, in an administrative proceeding, could correct a
clerical error.

The Supreme Court of Washington, in rejecting

this argument, noted that:
Inadvertent clerical errors creep into both
administrative and judicial proceedings. The
manner of handling clerical errors in judicial
proceedings is clear. An appellate court may
itself correct a clerical error in a judgment
appealed from without remanding the judgment to
the trial court for that purpose. A court has
inherent power to correct a clerical error in
order to make the true action of the court
conform to the record. In judicial proceedings,
rules exist to insure that substance shall not
give way to form, e.g., CR 60. Thus, a clerical
error can be corrected without reformation....
In the instant case the board has inherent power
to...determine whether a description contained in
the order with reference to the injury for which
an award is made is an inadvertent misdescription
correctable by it. Were the rule otherwise, the
board would be required to treat a clerical error
as if it were no error at all. This would give
an injured plaintiff an opportunity for
repetitive determination on the merits of his
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claim instead of only one to which all injured
workmen are entitled....[Emphasis supplied]
Cailihan, supra, at p. 1076.
In the case before the bar, the error was obvious on
the face of the pleadings:

the Order failed to incorporate the

Findings of Fact relative to the ultimate liability of
petitioner.

To argue that an appeal is the only remedy

available to correct clerical errors in a workers' compensation
case would defeat the purpose of adjudicating workers'
compensation cases in an administrative setting where
"non-technical rules are to apply...and... fairness is the
guiding principle."

Gardner v. Gardner Plumbing & Heating

Inc., Utah, 693 P. 2d 678, (1984).
In order to insure fairness and "carry out justly the
spirit of the workmen's compensation act," the legislature
granted the Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction.
Section 35-1-78 provides that:
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or
change with respect to former findings, or orders
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be
justified...
This section is most often invoked in recognition of
the fact that "industrial injuries are such that their full
extent cannot always be diagnosed with accuracy nor their
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consequences predicted with complete certainty."

Spencer v.

Industrial Commission of Utah. Utah, 290 P.2d 692 (1930) at p.
694.

But this is not the only appropriate application for

Section 35-1-78 motions.
[T]he power of the Industrial Commission as to
its continuing jurisdiction is not limited to
consideration of changes in [the] physical
condition of workmen, but is extended to [the]
right to rescind, alter, or amend orders,
decisions, or awards [when there is] good cause
appearing therefor.
Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 203 Cal. 522. 265 P. 195, cited with
approval in Carter v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 290
P. 776 (1920), at p. 779.
In granting the Default Indemnity Fund's motion in
this case, the Industrial Commission amended its Order based on
good cause.

To adopt the petitioner's argument and hold that

an administrative body cannot correct clerical errors unless
those errors are discovered before the time for appeal has
expired, would be to say that an administrative body must
"treat a clerical error as if it were no error at all."

This

position flies in the face of the philosophy behind
administrative law.

Can it be said that an error in addition

contained in an award of benefits in a workers' compensation
case could not be corrected?

Can it be said that Ms. Callihan

could collect a duplicate award for the injury to her right
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arm?

No, it cannot.

The Industrial Commission corrects its

clerical errors the same way a court does, with the exception
that the amended or supplemental order is granted pursuant to
Section 35-1-78 and not Rule 60(a).
C.
The January 22, 1985, Order was an
interlocutory order only, which did
not start the time running for the
filing of a motion for review.
In Lantham Co. v. the Industrial Commission of Utah,
29 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (March 7, 1986), this Court was presented
with a similar fact situation.

There the employee had suffered

"a prior eye injury in an industrial accident in Idaho1' and the
Utah employer "sought to shift part of its liability to the
Second Injury Fund.

On July 13, 1983, the law judge ordered an

apportionment of [the employee's] compensation benefits between
State Insurance and the Second Injury Fund.

The actual

apportionment, however, was deferred until the ultimate
impairment was established. ,f

(supra, at p. 46)

The law judge

then entered an amended order on August 17, 1983, which "fixed
the final allocation of liability between the Fund and State
Insurance" and the Fund appealed.
In finding that the Fund's appeal was timely, this
court held that:
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A law judge's order that only states
generally that liability shall be apportioned
between the insurance carrier and the Second
Injury Fund, without specifying the percentages
for which each shall be liable, is an
interlocutory order only and does not start the
time running for the filing of a motion for
review. The Fund's motion for review was filed
within fifteen days of the August 17, 1983
order. That was the order which established the
percentage of liability attributable to the Fund
and to State Insurance. Therefore, the Fund's
motion for review was timely filed.
Lantham, supra, at pp. 46-47.
In this case, the Order of January 22, 1985, found
that: (1) the employee was entitled to benefits; (2) the
employer was liable for those benefits; (3) that the employer
was "in no position to pay [the] benefits due in this matter
for the reason that for all practical purposes the employer is
insolvent..." and therefore; (4) the "employee is entitled to
an award from the Default Indemnity Fund."

(R. pp. 72-73)

That Order was final only as to the employee's
entitlement to benefits and the petitioner's then existing
inability to pay.

As to the Fund's subrogation rights, the

Order was silent and thus interlocutory in nature, reserving
that issue to a later date in the event the petitioner's
financial ability improved.

The law judge did not, in part

because he could not, order that petitioner escaped liability
altogether.

The law judge did not, because he could not, order
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that the Fund's subrogation rights were abolished.

The law

judge did not. because he could not. order that the petitioner
was "liable only if other sources of funds were not
available."

That would have been a clear abuse of discretion

defeating the spirit, letter and intention of the mandatory
insurance provisions of the law.
SUMMARY
Petitioner failed to raise any issue of merit in his
Writ of Review.

The Industrial Commission acted within its

jurisdiction and authority in granting the Default Indemnity
Fund's motion and should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

/A7
/ <—' day of June. 1986.

Suzan Pixton
Attorney for Respondents
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Attorneys for Petitioners
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

-I

"u

-34-

ADDENDUM A

A-1

STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN H.BANGERTER
_
Governof

I NSU R ANCE D EPARTM ENT

HAROLD C. YANCEY
Insurance Commissioner

160 East 300 South
P O. Box 45803
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Phone: (801) 530-6400

IT I S HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT THE ANNEXED:

CONSENT DECREE, DOCKET NO. 85-3, IN THE MATTER OF
GAIL JONES AND ROGERS INSURANCE, INC.

HAS BEEN COMPARED WITH THE ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THIS DEPARTMENT AND THAT
IT IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT THEREFROM AND OF THE WHOLE OF SAID ORIGINAL.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my
hand and affix the official seal of this
Department at Salt Lake City, Utah,

this

5th

day of

February

HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU
Insurance Commissioner

Z/()AJ}-K^U
inmissioner
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BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF UTAH:5sH,,,
;
"Will
IN THE MATTER OF

- £:

CONSENT DECREE

GAIL JONES,
ROGERS INSURANCE, INC.,

File Nos. 17802, 17803 and 17841

RESPONDENT

Docket No.

85-3

[_

STIPULATION AND CONSENT TO ORDER
1.

Respondent, Gail Jones, is a licensed Utah insurance

agent, holding insurance license number 31345-

Rogers Insurance.

Inc., is a licensed insurance organization, holding insurance
license number 01718.

Respondent admits the jurisdiction of the

State of Utah Insurance Department as to all matters herein.
2.

Respondent waives his right to be served with a Notice of

Hearing and Order to Show Cause regarding this matter and
stipulates with the Department as follows:
a.

That if a hearing were held herein, witnesses called

by the Department could offer testimony and introduce credible
evidence which would support the Findings of Fact herein;
b.

Respondent admits the accuracy of the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions made therefrom;
c.

Respondent stipulates to the summary entry of the

Order herein which shall be in lieu of other Departmental
proceedings in this matter; and

-2d.

That Respondent shall comply with all the terms of

the Order issued herein.
3.

Respondent is aware of his right to a hearing at which he

may be represented by counsel, present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.

Respondent has irrevocably waived his right to such

public hearing and to any court appeals relating thereto.
4.

Respondent is acting voluntarily herein, free from duress

or coercion o£ any kind or nature.
DATED this

3^

'day of

^J{JLSKJUISU

Gail Jones,
Respondent
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In the matter of Thomas A. Paulson Company, Respondent

received a premium payment of $102 on May 17, 1984 for workmens
compensation insurance.

Respondent failed to properly order the

insurance, failed to follow through to obtain a completed policy,
and failed to forward the premium payment to any company, and has
also failed to refund the premium to Mr. Thomas A. Paulson.
Respondent ignored and failed to respond to the Insurance
Department letter inquiry dated August 1, 1984.
2.

In the matter of Ms. Jeaneane M. Crannert, Respondent

received an order for automobile insurance in behalf of Bob
Blackley of C^mperworId.

Respondent intended to place the

-3insurance with Aid Insurance Company; however. Respondent failed
to order the insurance and failed to forward any premium to Aid
Insurance Company.

In approximately October. 1983 Mr. Blackley's

car was involved in a third party property damage accident with
Ms. Crannert.

Respondent was furnished* repair estimates from Ms.

Crannert in accordance with instructions she received from
Respondent's agency.

Respondent failed to respond to Ms. Crannert

or to her attorney, and failed to explain the lack of insurance'
coverage to Mr. Blackley.* Respondent ignored and failed to
respond to the Insurance Department letter inquiry dated May 30,
1984 and the follow-up letter dated June 29. 1984.

Respondent was

finally contacted by telephone on August 30. 1984 by the market
conduct examiner in the Insurance Department.

On September 10.

1984. about a year after the accident. Respondent issued a check
for $238.41 payable to Ms. Jeaneane Crannert.
3.

In the matter of Elizabeth M. Lykins. Respondent failed

to respond to the letter inquiry dated March 9. 1984 from the
Insurance Department regarding the insurance coverage question for
Ms. Lykins.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
1.

Respondent's failure to properly order workmens

compensation insurance and deliver a policy to Thomas A. Paulson
Company, failure to forward the premium payment to an insurer or
return the premium to Mr. Thomas, and ignoring and failing to

-4respond to the Insurance Department inquiry letter dated August 1.
1984, in violation of sections 31-17-22(3), 31-19-24 and 31-27-19,
U-C.A., constitute sufficient cause for the commissioner to
revoke, suspend or refuse' to renew Respondent's insurance license,
and the organization insurance license of Rogers Insurance, Inc.,
or impose a fine upon Respondents of up to $1,500, pursuant to
Sections 31-2-3(3), 31-17-9(4), 31-17-50(2)(4)(5)&(8), and
31-17-50.5, U.C.A.
2.

Respondent's failure to order automobile insurance for

Bob Blackley, leading both Mr. Blackley and Ms. Crannert to
believe there was insurance coverage in force, failure to respond
to Ms. Crannert regarding her property damage liability claim for
more than ten months, failure to respond to the Insurance
Department inquiry letter dated May 30, 1984, and acting as an
adjuster and unauthorized seFf-insurer by issuing a check
September 10, 1984 for $238.41 payable to Jeaneane Crannert to
cover her property damage liability claim in violation of Sections
31-17-5, 31-27-19, and 31-38-3, U.C.A., constitute sufficient
cause for the commissioner to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew
Respondent's insurance license, and the organization insurance
license of Rogers Insurance, Inc., or impose a fine upon
Respondent of up to $1,500, pursuant to Sections 31-17-9(4).
31-17-50(2) . (5)&(8) , and 31-17-50.*5, U.C.A. or impose a fine upon
Respondents up to $10,000 pursuant to Section 31-8-8, U.C.A.
3.

Respondent's failure to respond to tha Insurance

-5sufficient cause for the commissioner to revoke, suspend or refuse
to renew Respondent's insurance license and the organization
license of Rogers.Insurance, Inc. or impose a fine upon Respondent
of up to $1,500, pursuant to Sections 31-2-3(3), 31-17-50(2)&(8),
and 31-17-50.5. U.C.A.
4.

That as a consequence of said violations and pursuant to

Sections 31-17-50 and 31-17-50.5, U.C.A., it is hereby:
a.

That Respondent shall pay a fine of $250 to the Utah

State Insurance Department.

The fine shall be fully paid within

thirty (30) days from the'date of this Order.

If not paid when

due, the Respondent's insurance agent's license shall be revoked
without further notice.
b.

That this Order "is made in lieu of other Departmental

proceedings relating to the matter herein set forth.
DONE AND ORDERED this

V

'^~~

day of

<?.<'?<U/''-^** , 1 9 8 _ 2 T
/

ROGER C. DAY
Commissioner of'-Insurance

Jef f/ Gabardi
.Deputy Commissioner
(state of Utah Insurance Department
160 East 300 South, Second Floor
P.O. Box 45803
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801)530-6400
0470J

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on the

day of January,

1985, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing executed
Consent Decree. Docket No. 85-3, to Mr. Gail Jones, Rogers
Insurance. Inc., P.O. Box 725, Provo, Utah 84603-0725, postage
pre-paid.

- XflLlJL

dJ

kAUjd)

Julie Anderson
Secretary to Commissioner Day

ADDENDUM B

A-2

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to
be paid.
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43
who is injured, and the dependents of every such
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of
or in the course of his employment, wherever such
injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss
sustained on account of the injury or death, and
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under
this chapter shall be on the employer and its
insurance carrier and not on the employee.
l**

35-1-52. Agreements in lieu of compensation and
benefits.
Subject to the approval of the commission, any
employer may enter into or continue any agreement
with his employees to provide a system of compensation or other benefits in lieu of the compensation
and other benefits provided by this title. No such
substitute system shall be approved unless it confers
benefits upon injured employees and their dependents at least equivalent to the compensation provided
by this title, nor if it requires contributions from
the employees, unless it confers benefits in addition
to those provided under this title at least commensurate with such contributions. Such substitute
system may be terminated by the commission, after
a hearing on reasonable notice to the interested
parties, if it shall appear that the same is not fairly
administered, or if its operation shall disclose
defects threatening its solvency, or if for any substantial reason it fails to accomplish the purposes of
this title; and in such case the commission shall
determine the proper distribution of all remaining
assets, if any Any employer who makes a
deduction for such purposes from the wages or
salary of any r-npioyee emitled to the benefit of this
title is guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, that
subject to the supervision of the commission,
nothing in this title shall be construed as preventing
the employer and his employees from entering, and
it shall be lawful for them to enter into mutual
contracts and agreements respecting hospital
benefits and accommodations and medical and
surgical services, nursing and medicines to be
furnished the employees as in this title provided, if
no profit, directly or indirectly, is made by any
employer as a result of such contract or agreement;
the purpose and intent of this section being that,
where hospitals are maintained and medical and
surgical services and medicines furnished by the
employer from payments by, or assessments on, his
employees, such payments or assessments shall be
no more or greater than necessary to make such
hospital benefits and accommodations, including
surgical and medical services and medicines, selfsupporting for the care and treatment of his employees, and that all sums received or retained by the
employer from the employees for such purpose shall
be paid and applied thereto, and provided further,
that such hospitals so maintained in whole or in
part by payments or assessment of employees shall
be subject to the inspection and supervision of the
commission as to services and treatment rendered
such employees
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35-1-46. Employers to secure compensation - Ways
allowed - Failure - Notice • Injunction - Violation •
Penalty.
Employers including counties, cities, towns and
school districts shall secure compensation to their
employees m one of the following ways:
(1) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment
of such compensation with the state insurance fund,
which payments shall commence within 90 days of
any final award of the commission.
*&
(2) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment
of such compensation with any stock corporation ox
mutual association authorized to transact the
business of workmen's compensation insurance in
this state, which payments shall commence within
90 days of any final award by the commission.
(3) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct
compensation in the amount, in the manner and
when due as provided for in this title, which
payments shall commence within 90 days of any
final award by the commission. In such cases the
commission may in its discretion require the deposit
of acceptable security, indemnity or bond to secure
the payment of compensation liabilities as they are
incurred, and may at any time change or modify its
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its
judgment such action is necessary or desirable to
secure or assure a strict compliance with all the
provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the furnishing of medical, nurse and
hospital services, medicines and burial expenses to
injured, and to the dependents of killed employees.
The commission may in proper cases revoke any
employer's privilege as a self-insurer.
The commission is hereby authorized and
empowered to maintain a suit in any court of the
state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions
of this act, from further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has failed to insure
or to keep insured in one of the three ways in this
section provided, the payment of compensation to
injured employees, and upon a showing of such
failure to insure the court shall enjoin the further
operation of such business until such time as such
insurance has been obtained by the employer. The
court may enjoin the employer without requiring
bond from the commission.
If the commission has reason to believe that an
employer of one or more employees is conducting a
business without securing the payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in this
section, the commission may give such employer
five days' written notice by registered mail of such
noncompliance and if the employer within said
period does not remedy such default, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided
and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue
without bond a temporary injunction restraining the
further operation of the employer's business.
Any employer who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of section 35-1-46 shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon complaint of the commission and conviction thereof shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $10 nor more than $100 or by
imprisonment in the county jail for not less than
thirty days nor more than six months or by both
such fine and imprisonment. Each day's failure
shall be a separate offense All funds so collected
shall be deposited in the special fund as described in
section 35-1-68 and used for the purposes in this
title provided.
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35-1-56. Compliance with act - Notice to employees.
Each employer providing insurance, or electing
directly to pay compensation to his injured, or the
dependents of his killed employees, as herein
provided, shall post in conspicuous places about his
place of business typewritten or printed notices
stating, that he has complied with the provisions of
this title and all the rules and regulations of the
commission made in pursuance thereof, and if such
is the case, that he has been authorized by the
commission directly to compensate such employees
or dependents; and the same, when so posted, shall
constitute sufficient notice to his employees of the
fact that he has complied with the law as to
securing compensation to his employees and their
dependents.
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to comply.
Any employee, whose employer has failed to
comply with the provisions of section 35-1-46, who
has been injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment, wheresoever" such injury
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted
, or his dependents in case death has ensued, may,
in lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil
action in the courts as provided in the last preceding
section [35-1-57], file his application with the
commission for compensation in accordance with
the terms of this title, and the commission shall
hear and determine such application for compensation as in other cases; and the amount of compensation which the commission may ascertain and
determine to be due to such injured employee, or
his dependents in case death has ensued, shall be
paid by such employer to the persons entitled
thereto within ten days after receiving notice of the
amount thereof as so fixed and determined by the
commission.
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35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court Enforcing judgment.

35-1-57. Noncompliance - Penalty.
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to
the benefits of this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil action to
their employees for damages suffered by reason of
personal injuries arising out of or in the course of
employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of the employer or any of the employer's
officers, agents or employees, and also to the depe-

ndents or personal representatives of such
employees where death results from such injuries. ID
any such action the defendant shall not avail
himself of any of the following defenses: the
defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of
assumption of risk, or the defense of contributory
negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute
prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the employer and the burden shall be upon the
employer tc show freedom from negligence resulting
in such injury. And such employers shall also be
subject to the provisions of the two sections next
succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any civil action
permitted under this section against the employer
the employee shall be entitled to necessary costs and
a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the
employer.
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An abstract of any award may be filed in the
office of the clerk of the district court of any
county in the state, and must be docketed in the
judgment docket of the district court thereof. The
time of the receipt of the abstract must be noted by
him thereon and entered in the docket. When so
filed and docketed the award shall constitute a lien
from the time of such docketing upon the real
property of the employer situated in the county, for
a period of eight years from the date of the award
unless previously satisfied. Execution maybe issued
thereon within the same time and in the same
manner and with the same effect as if said award
were a judgment of the district court.
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the
time of the injury, the county attorney for the
county in which the applicant or the employer
resides, depending on the district in which the final
award is docketed, shall enforce the judgment when
requested by the industrial commission. Where the
action to enforce a judgment is initiated by other
counsel, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs
shall be allowed in addition to the award.
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35*1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or
officer, agent or employee • Occupational disease
excepted.

The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by
an employee, whether resulting in death or not,
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall
be in place of any arid all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such
employee or to his spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives, guardian, or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course of
or because of or arising out of his employment, and
no action at law may be maintained against an
employer or against any officer, agent or employee
of the employer based upon any accident, injury or
death of an employee. Nothing in this section,
however, shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases
within the provision of the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Act, as amended.
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35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to
modify award - Authority to destroy records Interest on award.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing, and it may from
time to time make such modification or change with
respect to former findings, or orders with respect
thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided,
however, that records pertaining to cases, other
than those of total permanent disability or where a
claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which have been
closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be
destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
Awards made by the industrial commission shall
include interest at the rate of 8^G per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
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35-1-8S. Rules of evidence and procedure before
commission and hearing examiner - Admissible
evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner
shall be bound by the usual common-law or
statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or
formal rules of procedure, other than as herein
provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant
to this act. The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use
as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed
material and relevant including, but not limited to
the following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in
open hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians,
or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the
commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time
sheets, book accounts or other records.
(c) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
diseased employee.
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35-1-107. Default Indemnity Fund - Creation •
Liability • Funding • Administration • Subrogation.
(1) There is created a Default Indemnity Fund for
the purpose of paying and assuring, to persons
entitled t o , workers 1 compensation benefits when an
employer becomes insolvent, appoints or has
appointed a receiver, or otherwise dots not have
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other
security to cover workers' compensation liabilities
under this chapter. If it becomes necessary t o pay
benefits, the fund will be liable for all obligations
of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 a n d 2 ,
Title 35.
(2) Funds for the Default Indemnity Fund are to
be provided pursuant to Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a).
The state treasurer snail be the custodian of the
Default Indemnity Fund and the commission shall
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The attorney
general shall appoint a member of his staff to
represent the Default Indemnity Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf
of the fund.
. ,
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other
benefits paid or payable to an employee or their
dependents from the Default Indemnity Fund, the
fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers,
and benefits of the employee or their dependents
against the employer failing to make the compensation payments.
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory
successor of an insolvent employer shall be bound
by settlements o f covered -claims by the fund. T h e
court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments
made under this section a priority equal to that to
which the claimant would have been entitled in the
absence of this section against the assets o f the
insolvent employer. T h e expenses of the fund in
handling claims shall be accorded the same priority
as the liquidator's expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the
receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent
employer or insurance carrier statements of the
covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of
anticipated claims against the fund which shall
preserve the rights of the fund for claims against
the assets of the insolvent employer.
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the Default Indemnity Fund
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect o f
another person not in the same employment, the
fund has the same rights as allowed under Section
35-1-62.
(7) The fund, subject to approval o f the Workers'
Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its
own claims or contracting with an adjusting
company, risk management company, insurance
company, or other company that has expertise and
capabilities in adjusting and paying worker's compensation claims.
(8) For the purpose o f maintaining this fund, the
commission, upon rendering a decision with respect
to any claim from the Default Indemnity Fund for
compensation under this chapter, shall impose a
penalty against the employer of l5^o of the total
award made in the claim and shall direct that the
additional penalty be paid into the fund. Awards
may be docketed as other awards under this
chapter.
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state treasurer, with respect to
payment of any compensation benefits, expenses,
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against
the fund, is limited to the assets in the fund, and
they are not otherwise in any way liable for the
making of any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules
for the processing and payment o f claims for compensation out of the fund.
ift4

Rule 60.

Relief from Judgment or Order

(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice,
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal,
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court

